Normality and Pathology in a Biological Age by Rose, Nicolas
Summary
The article is the text of a lecture given at the Faculty
of the Humanities, March 2001. It argues that one
implication of recent advances in the sciences of life
may be that the binary opposition of the normal and
the pathological is put into question. Canguilheim’s
distinction between vital and social norms is chal-
lenged and superseded by a Foucauldian genealogi-
cal approach to programs for the government of indi-
viduals, and the norms of life that emerged in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries are argued to be
fundamentally social. Viewing genetics, biopsychia-
try, and the commercialisation of drug development
and biomedicine, the author argues that the logic of
normalisation is loosing its hold, and being replaced
by strategies for the continuous molecular manage-
ment of variation, the modulation of susceptibilities,
and the capitalisation of life itself.
Introduction
Since about the middle of the nine-teenth century, our ways of governinghuman conduct have been structured
by the division between the normal and the
abnormal – by the idea of norm and devia-
tion. Across the twentieth century, the norm
was medicalised, statisticalised, moralised
and socialised – to be normal was to be
healthy, to be average, to be virtuous and to
be socially acceptable. A host of professions
came to organise their thoughts, calculations
and judgements in terms of the binary of the
normal and the pathological, and to conceive
of their interventions in terms of a project of
normalisation. So, as we enter the 21st cen-
tury, are we still governed by the logic of the
norm? And what are the implications of re-
cent advances in the sciences of life – from
the decoding of the human genome to the
new neuroscientific knowledges of the brain
and its mechanisms – and of the linked de-
velopments in the technologies of treatment
– from the cloning of stem cells to psy-
chopharmacology?
I am writing these words on the very day
when the first ‘map’ of the human genome is
published on the internet – the 11th February
2001. As you will all know by now, this pro-
duced at least one major surprise – there
were too few genes! Rather than the 100,000
or so genes that had been confidently pre-
dicted, there seem to be only around 31,000
sequences coding for chains of amino acids
– which compares with 6,000 for a yeast cell,
13,000 for a fruit fly, 20,000 for a nematode
worm and 26,000 for an average plant. So
where are all those genes that account for our
vast behavioural repertoire, for our con-
sciousness, for our physical co-ordination,
for learning and memory? This doesn’t
seem to be a ‘parts list’ to make a human –
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even a modern jet aeroplane contains more
than 200,000 unique parts. The predictions
and anxieties about ‘the gene for’ everything
from homosexuality to a sense of humour –
both those of the gene hunters and those of
their sociological critics – seem to have been
confounded. Craig Venter of Celera Geno-
mics, who hoped to be the legal owner of the
human genome, pronounced “The notion
that one gene equals one disease, or that one
gene produces one protein, is flying out of
the window”.1 The project is regrouping –
around the genes that control genes, or
around the interactions between genes. Or
perhaps, as theologians rush to suggest, in
the space between the paucity of genes and
the richness of human existence and creati-
vity lies a space for god, a space for the soul:
as Paul Rabinow has shown in French DNA,
the French have been hard at work for some
time to produce the spiritual in this genomic
domain (Rabinow, 1999).
The very idea of what it is to be human is
being reshaped by these new knowledges
and techniques of human individuality. But
this is not taking the form that critics had
predicted. In genomics, the information pa-
radigm – code of codes, book of life, digital
instructions and the like – has been thrown
into doubt as the genome itself seems to be
full of all sorts of relics of the past, introject-
ed sequences from bacteria, strange and ap-
parently functionless duplications, sequen-
ces long deactivated. The human genome
seems more like an assemblage put together
over millennia by squabbling tribes of mad
bricoleurs than a digital programme written
by the harsh logic of natural selection, and
survival of the selfish gene. Something –
postgenomics – is taking shape. And in oth-
er areas too, the reshaping of personhood
brought about by new life sciences is not tak-
ing the essentialist, reductionist, determinist
form that many had anticipated. Histories of
the present turn out to be easier to write than
fictions of the future. But perhaps we can at-
tempt some diagnoses, not to predict the fu-
ture or even to describe the present, but to
find the lines of truth and power within
which the new human beings of the biologi-
cal age are coming into existence.
Norms
Let me start with norms. As is wellknow, the French historian and phi-losopher of the life sciences, Georges
Canguilhem (1978) argued that there was a
fundamental distinction between two types
of norms – vital norms and social norms. In
On The Normal and the Pathological, he as-
serted that life was itself a vital and norma-
tive process. Vital norms arose from the very
nature of living beings and the constant work
of adaptation that they try to do in order to
resist death. The vital norms of the living be-
ing are not merely human judgements or sta-
tistical averages across a population. Vital
normativity, in the life sciences and medi-
cine, arose from the specific character of
their object – of living beings. He writes “It
is life itself, and not medical judgement that
makes the biological normal a concept of
value and not a concept of statistical reality.”
(ibid., 43). Health, for the living organism, is
not just normality but normativity – the vital
force that resists disease. Pathology was a re-
duction of this vital normativity – illness was
fixity, inability to adapt, stasis. Life was or-
ganic, systematic, self regulating – hence the
importance of disease for knowledge: “Dis-
ease reveals normal functions to us at the
precise moment when it deprives us of their
existence… Health is organic innocence. It
must be lost, like all innocence, so that
knowledge may be possible… the truly vital
wonder is the anguish caused by disease.”
(ibid., 52)
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But Canguilhem thought that social norms
were very different. Social norms manifest
only adaptation to a particular artificial order
of society. They arise from the requirements
of those in power for normativity, docility,
productivity, harmony and the like. In a
widely quoted passage, he remarks that
“Between 1759, when the word ‘normal’ ap-
peared, and 1834 when the word ‘nor-
malised’ appeared, a normative class had
won the power to identify – a beautiful ex-
ample of ideological illusion – the function
of social norms, whose content it deter-
mined, with the use that that class made of
them” (ibid., 151). The norms of the econo-
my, of the school, of the legal system and so
forth thus arose from judgements of desira-
bility made by groups with particular inter-
ests. And the most intense problems arise
where one set of norms are read in terms of
the other – when social norms were treated
as if they were vital, and arose from the na-
ture of the human being, rather than from a
contingent social judgement of personhood.
The critical slogans of much social science
echo this view – essentialism, reductionism,
determinism, geneticisation – each suggests
that a social judgement of deviation from de-
sirability is taken to be a vital pathology.
From this perspective, it is tempting to
suggest that the new politics of life have
once more mistaken social norms of person-
hood for vital ones. Thus we could argue that
a social norm of health has replaced a vital
one – health as eternal youth, as physical
perfection, as ever prolonged life expectan-
cy, as fertility for all and at any age and so
forth. And, in relation to the mind, one could
argue that it is a social norm of happiness,
contentment and adjustment, for example,
that underlies contemporary psychiatry. In
its new guise – psycho-pharmacology – it
seems to have taken key features of vitality
itself as abnormalities open to normalisation.
Sadness becomes treatable depression, dis-
like of social situations becomes treatable
social phobia – in the name of a social, not a
vital, norm of health. I’ll return to these ex-
amples later.
For Michel Foucault, Canguilhem’s pupil,
however, it was not only social norms that
had a history – vital norms were historical
too. Foucault argued that the very idea of the
norm took shape within programmes for the
government of individual and collective
existence in nineteenth century Europe.
These programmes gridded the space and
time of existence with standards of conduct –
of dress, manners, punctuality, conduct, per-
formance. This enabled judgements of de-
viation to be made in the schools, factories,
army, hospital, reformatory, and processes of
normalisation to be set in motion. And these
norms were linked up with those of medi-
cine, they were naturalised. Take nineteenth
century psychiatry. On the one hand, it col-
lected a whole array of undesirable forms of
conduct within its mandate – public disorder,
promiscuity, dangerousness, inebriety – a
vast expansion of the symptomatic field.
And, on the other hand, via the link with
medicine, it brought these violations of
norms of conduct into relation with the idea
of abnormalities in the healthy functioning of
bodily processes. Norms of conduct get un-
derstood in terms of the binary of health and
morbidity. From now on, psychiatry will
deal with a medico-judicial field in which
these two sorts of norms are inextricably
mixed.
But vital norms themselves could only
arise within specific apparatuses for the go-
vernment of health. One such apparatus was
the enclosed institutional space of the hospi-
tal. Large numbers of sick people were ob-
served, their details were recorded, as they
were citizens after all. Their symptoms were
observed and written down in case notes.
Their prognosis was followed. And after they
were dead, their corpses were opened up by
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dissection, and the organic seat of their sad
decline was revealed to the medical gaze.
Vital norms arose only when the individual
gaze of the doctor or the anatomist could be
statisticalised in these ‘machines for cure’.
But vital norms were social too: as Foucault
was fond of pointing out, medicine was the
first ‘social’ science. The norms of longevity,
morbidity, reproduction and so forth arose in
projects for the government of collective
health and sickness. They were mapped out
through statistics of birth, death, rates and
types of morbidity. They emerged in prac-
tices ranging from sewage systems to insur-
ance that regulated the population in the
name of health. All these processes – let us
call them biopolitics – were conditions for
the emergence of the notion of the idea of the
vital normativity of the living human being
and the human population.
So my point is that social and vital norms
of individuals and populations have always
been inextricably intertwined at the very
heart of medical knowledge. Such norms
were developed further in the programmes of
social welfare and national health that took
shape across the twentieth century. It was in
the universal and compulsory practices of
schooling that the idea of ‘normal develop-
ment’ in the child was formed, including
normal physical development, and all the
techniques of weighing, measuring, assess-
ing were invented: they solidified the idea
that there were biological norms of height,
weight and development and that deviations
were biomedical abnormalities – slow devel-
opment, obesity and so forth. Our norms of
procreation, which radically changed the vi-
tal lives of women, emerged within domesti-
cation of sexuality and reproduction in the
family. Our beliefs about which human ills
were normal and which were treatable arose
from the transformation of the home into a
machine for creating and maintaining hy-
giene. Norms of the labouring body arose
from the penetration of the gaze of welfare
medicine into the workplace, which also
gave us the apparently natural life course –
the times when one was too young to labour,
the times of labour, and the times of retire-
ment. And so forth.
These norms and judgements still shape
much medical thought and practice. But con-
temporary ideas of health and life do not
arise out of these zones that have been grid-
ded by government. New forces are judging
vitality in relation to different objectives.
There are the commercial organisations such
as the pharmaceutical companies whose in-
terests are the bottom line – profit. There are
professionals ranging from doctors to re-
search scientists where humanistic aspira-
tions are linked to mundane concerns for
fame, fortune and career, advancement in
their careers, fame and fortune. There are in-
surance companies with their criteria for
benefits and so forth. There are medical in-
stitutions with their decisions as to whom to
treat, at what ages for what conditions, under
what criteria – for example, should there be
‘treatment’ for infertility, or plastic surgery
for children with Downs’ syndrome – deci-
sions that are simultaneously concerned with
efficacy, equity and economy. There are phil-
anthropic bodies, such as NGOs, charities,
pressure groups and campaigning organisa-
tions who now play a key role in demanding
the rights to health, and to treatment for all
manner of conditions and persons. And, of
course, the subjects and patients themselves
now play a key role in shaping our judge-
ments as to what is ‘a suitable case for treat-
ment’.
In this new configuration we have exami-
nations galore, but they do not seem to ope-
rate in terms of hierarchical observation, dis-
tribution of individuals according to their
qualities, and normalising judgement against
institutional expectations. There are plenty
of charts of normal functioning, and graphs
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of distributions, but these do not seem to be
standards to judge some as failing and to
open them up for control. These new ways of
assessing and intervening upon persons
seem to operate differently. How should we
analyse them?
Variation
Take, for instance the question of the‘normal’ human genome. Is theresuch a thing? In the early days of hu-
man genome project, when the term ‘geneti-
cisation’ came into fashion amongst critics, it
was often thought that the sequencing of the
human genome would establish such a single
‘normal’ sequence – a composite or ‘consen-
sus genome’. It was suggested that this se-
quence would serve as a norm of health
against which all discrepancies would be
judged as morbid abnormalities (e.g. Flower
and Heath 1993). A new form of molecular
surveillance was often predicted that would
categorise individuals as healthy or patho-
logical on the basis of the sequences of bases
on their genome, and would divide them up
and administer their lives in the light of this
implacable biological truth.
Cut to the present. The draft sequence of
the human genome published on 11th Fe-
bruary does not produce a single ‘normal’ se-
quence. On the contrary, it appears that there
are millions of locations on the genome
where individuals differ from one another by
a single base – an A is substituted by a C, for
example.2 The variations that comprise such
SNPs – we are sure to discover more of them
– do not seem to function along the axis of
the normal and the pathological or the
healthy and the sick. The two genomes
(DNA sequences) that each of us carry differ
from one another as well as from those car-
ried by other individuals. Every sequence
identified as a ‘gene’ now seemed to be
marked by such variation. In the human
genome, to quote a recent article on pharma-
cogenomics “the normal is rare”.3 Or, per-
haps, one might say: variation is the norm.
This is a variation so complex and multidi-
mensional that it cannot easily be mapped
onto the earlier ideas of genes as single enti-
ties which exist in a small number of alleles,
some of which are normal, others pathologi-
cal. This new molecular vision of individual-
ity does not seem to operate in terms of the
binary of normal and pathological or the
mapping of a social judgement of worth onto
a medical judgement of morbidity. We seem
to have a geneticisation of variability without
the reciprocal positing of a norm – variation
without a norm.
I’d like to consider this idea by saying a
bit about three areas that seem unrelated, but
will help me explore the contemporary re-
shaping of personhood. The first is ‘suscep-
tibilities’. The second is biopsychiatry. And
the third is commerce.
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2 The ‘public’ genome identifies some 1.42 million sing-
le nucleotide polymorphisms, Craig Venter’s group identi-
fy 2.1 million SNPs, very few of which – less than 1% –
seem to result in variations of the proteins coded.
3 ‘In his 1997 book, Pharmacogenetics, Wendell W.
Weber quotes from Somerset Maugham’s account of his
experiences as a young medical student. ... “I have always
worked from the living model. I remember that once in the
dissecting room when I was going over my ‘part’ with the
demonstrator, he asked me what some nerve was and I did
not know. He told me; whereupon I remonstrated, for it
was in the wrong place. Nevertheless he insisted that it
was the nerve I had been looking in vain for. I complained
of the abnormality and he, smiling, said that in anatomy it
was the normal that was uncommon. I was annoyed at the
time, but the remark sank into my mind and since then it
has become forced upon me that it was true of man as well
as anatomy. The normal is what you find but rarely. The
normal is the ideal. It is a picture that one fabricates of the
average characteristics of men, and to find them all in a
single man is hardly to be expected.” Maugham’s observa-
tion -that the normal is rare -is at the heart of the challenge
and promise of pharmacogenomics.’ (Norton, 2001: 180)
Thanks to Oonagh Corrigan for this quote.
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Susceptibilities
In recent medico-ethical debates about thegenetics and therapy of particular condi-tions, normativity no longer seems to be
understood in terms of the self-regulation of
a vital order. When the human being is
viewed through a molecular gaze, in terms of
sequences of bases in stretches of DNA, the
vocabulary of abnormality seems to mutate.
There is still a logic of absolute pathology –
disorders such as Huntington’s arise in-
escapably from a specific identified set of
repetitions in the base sequences in a particu-
lar gene region. But even that fatal logic is
not a logic of fatalism as Carlos Novas and I
have argued elsewhere (Novas & Rose,
2000). In any event, such apparently implaca-
ble pathologies are merely the extreme point
of a rather different perception. One might
call this ‘risk’. But that word is overworked:
let us think in terms of ‘susceptibility’.
This shift from implacable abnormalities
to manageable susceptibilities is an element
in a wider reshaping in practices for the gov-
ernment of persons. Gilles Deleuze has sug-
gested that contemporary societies are no
longer disciplinary, in the sense identified by
Foucault – they are societies of control.
Where discipline sought to fabricate individ-
uals whose capacities and forms of conduct
were indelibly and permanently inscribed
into the soul – in home, school or factory –
today control is continuous and integral to all
activities and practices of existence. We are
required to be flexible, to be in continuous
training, life-long learning, perpetual assess-
ment, continual incitement to buy, to im-
prove oneself, constant monitoring of health
and never-ending risk management. A recur-
rent demonstration of capacity is required in
order to obtain work, credit, insurance, citi-
zenship – the active citizen must engage in a
constant work of modulation, adjustment,
improvement.
This is evident in the obligations to our cor-
poreal existence. At the gross level, we know
these only too well – the obligation to take
care of oneself, to adjust lifestyle, diet, alco-
hol consumption, and the like in the light of
information about health consequences, the
requirement to inspect ones breasts or testes
for symptoms of cancer, to have regular
medical check ups, to optimise ones corpo-
real existence. This is not merely for oneself,
but because, through the activation of this
will to health, one will also perform a service
for the national economy (state expenditure
on health care and pensions), for the fitness
and competitiveness of the labour force, and
for ones family and kin. Of course, we are
not all good subjects of this ethics of health
– despite the risk of exclusion for employ-
ment, insurance, perhaps soon even health
care itself, to say nothing of the risks of ill-
ness and early death – hence the space
opened up for the professionals of health
promotion.
What is added to this by the contemporary
developments in the life sciences and bio-
medicine? Previously the assessment of risk
was probabilistic – it operated in terms of
one’s location in a risk group by family his-
tory, body mass index, status as a man of a
certain age or whatever. What is now pro-
mised is a precise calibration of one’s indi-
vidual, specific susceptibilities. New medi-
cal classifications of illness are framed in
these terms. For example, one condition in-
volving fronto-temporal Dementia and Par-
kinsonism is known as FTDP-17 because it
is linked to a number of mutations in a spe-
cific region of chromosome 17. Increased
susceptibility to breast cancer has been
linked to the mutations known as BRCA1
and BRCA2 on chromosome 13. Research-
ers have tried to link variations in personali-
ty such as novelty seeking, or psychiatric
disorders such as manic depression, with the
synthesis or non-synthesis of particular pro-
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teins or the characteristics of particular neu-
ronal transmitters or neural receptor sites –
chromosome 11 being a particular favourite.
The mapping of the human genome, and the
identification of SNPs will merely accelerate
these processes.
We have moved, if you like, from mass
production to niche marketing. Enthusiasts
claim that such screening will soon be able
to reveal individual ‘susceptibilities’ under-
stood in terms of particular polymorphisms
particular locations on a specific chromo-
some. This will reshape genetic counselling
of partners before embarking on procreation
– they will now have the option to examine
the precise print-out of their genetic errors
and to assess their compatibility – or to wil-
fully, perhaps irresponsibly, refuse. Screen-
ing of foetuses before birth in many coun-
tries is almost obligatory, especially for par-
ents in high risk groups – now some suggest
that the characteristics of the foetus, its
virtues and defects, the story of the ills it will
be heir to, will be readable before it has any
interests to defend. Private firms, especially
in the USA, are offering genetic profiling to
adults on a commercial basis – a genomic
version of fortune telling perhaps. And, in
routine medical use, conditions are already
being located to specific molecular specifici-
ties which can be identified by the screening
long before they manifest themselves.
Awareness that one is liable to a late onset
genetic condition will spread from the few to
the many.
In this sense, then, the ambit of disease,
and the powers of the doctor are greatly ex-
tended to engage those who are neither phe-
nomenologically nor experientially ill. Such
persons may indeed live healthily for years,
never become ill, or be injured or die in a
hundred other ways. Everyone has their own
susceptibilities, everyone becomes, in poten-
tial at least, asymptomatically ill and a suit-
able case for medical tutelage. But, before
we rush too quickly to condemn geneticisa-
tion, reductionism, determinisms and the
like, we need to pause. The idea of risk as-
sessment conjures up images of certainty
and calculability and hence, perhaps, a cer-
tain fatalism. But in the world of susceptibil-
ities, the management of uncertainty is the
norm – for molecular presymptomatic diag-
nosis gives no calculability to the ‘when’ or
the ‘how’ of illness or death, nor to the man-
ifold life decisions that must be made be-
tween the moment of diagnosis and this
imagined end point. What arises in this new
space of uncertainty, is not fatalism, not what
Robert Proctor has termed ‘enlightened im-
potence’ (Proctor, 1995: 247), not merely an-
xiety, guilt, fear, stigmatisation and discrim-
ination without hope of remedy,4 although all
these are important. We also see the birth of
new forms of activism – the crafting of a life
and modulation of a lifestyle – in relation to
oneself, one’s kin, one’s progeny, one’s fel-
low sufferers – in the light of ones suscep-
tibilities. The potential sufferer is to become
skilled, prudent and active, an ally of the
doctor, a proto-professional – and to take
their own share of the responsibility for man-
aging their bio-genetic selves. Those who are
designated at genetic risk and their families
are not passive elements in the search for
remedies. Such persons are increasingly de-
manding control over the practices linked to
their own health, seeking multiple forms of
expert and non-expert advice in devising
their life strategies, and asking of medics that
they act as the servants and not the masters
of this process. Persons identified as suscep-
tible to a particular condition have an invest-
ment in scientists fulfilling their promises
and discovering the basis of, and the cure or
treatment for, genetic conditions.
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Contemporary biomedicine, like its prede-
cessors, is one of the key sites for the fabri-
cation of the contemporary self – free yet re-
sponsible, enterprising, prudent, encourag-
ing the conduct of life in a calculative man-
ner by acts of choice with an eye to the fu-
ture and to increasing their well-being. Ge-
netic personhood is one of ‘genetic responsi-
bility’. And genetic responsibility induces
new forms of biological community – what
Paul Rabinow has termed ‘biosociality’ (No-
vas & Rose, 2000, Rose, in press). Consider,
for example, the Genetic Alliance which,
since the mid-1980s has sought to foster “ a
dynamic coalition of consumers and profes-
sionals to promote the interests of children,
adults and families living with genetic con-
ditions” bringing together almost 300 sup-
port groups with consumers and health care
professionals, “creating partnership solu-
tions to common concerns about access and
availability of quality genetics services.”5
Those with similar genetic susceptibilities,
or their families, gather into support groups,
run websites and email discussion lists, raise
funds for medical research, engage their own
medical experts, and develop and dissemi-
nate practices for crafting a life ‘at risk’ and
a new ethics of the susceptible.
This is not to deny that bio-genetic per-
sonhood is also linked to new forms of ex-
clusion. Most critics fear a new genetic divi-
sion between normality and pathology, now
inscribed implacably in ones genes. Absolute
otherness remains. But elsewhere, we seem
to have moved beyond the binary opposition
between a normal body and one destined, by
its genes, to abnormality. The vocabulary of
risk assessment and risk management illumi-
nates these new relations between control by
inclusion and control by exclusion. Risk
thinking – say in the case of psychiatry en-
tails attempts at the constant monitoring, su-
pervision and management thought neces-
sary to maintain ‘risky’ or ‘at risk’ individu-
als in the circuits of everyday life. But it also
reveals what one might think of as the ‘three
faces of risk’. The first face is turned to those
whom professionals judge to be permanent-
ly unable to manage their risk: the response
is incapacitation. This is notably the case in
strategies for the preventive detention of in-
corrigible individuals such as sexual preda-
tors, paedophiles and the intractably anti-so-
cial. The new biology plays a part here, as
biological criminologists and forensic psy-
chiatrists search for methods to discover the
biological underpinnings of such conduct.
For some at least, the objectivity apparently
promised by the new molecular biology and
genetics is called on to legitimate the deten-
tion of an individual, not on the grounds of
what they have done – deviant conduct – but
on the grounds of who they are – their bio-
genetic personhood. This would enable the
experts to meet political demand that they
should be able to identify members of this
new class of ‘monsters’, before they commit
their offences, or after they serve their allot-
ted term of imprisonment. For these mon-
sters, a residual biological determinism
seems strategically essential.
The second face of risk is turned to those
who are not monsters, but merely trouble-
some: the drug addicts, alcoholics, repeat
petty offenders, those judged chronically
mentally ill. For these individuals, one sees
the developments of a new penal-welfare
complex, a kind of cycling between the
street, the shelter or the half way house into
the prison, mental hospital or secure unit.
Secure provision here functions, in the last
resort, as a form of internal exile to sequester
those who appear threatening or merely dis-
turbing to public order – as in the idea of
zero tolerance policing. The strategy is one
of long term risk management. Ideally, the
risk posed by such troublesome individuals
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would be managed without incarceration, of-
ten by combining professional surveillance
with long term administration of psychiatric
drugs. But where the experts consider that
the individual is unable to manage their risk-
iness prudently – to keep taking their med-
ication in order to control their symptoms, or
to modify their behaviour by abstaining from
drugs, alcohol or petty crime – they are to be
returned to hospital or prison where further
risk reduction measures may be put in place
– sometimes involving cognitive forms of
therapy to teach the skills of behavioural
control and the ‘insight’ necessary to keep
taking the tablets. Here too the new biomed-
icine feels it has something to offer. On the
one hand, there are the new non-traditional
neuroleptic drugs with an apparently lower
side effect profile to reduce the chances of
‘non-compliance’ with the maintenance the-
rapy. And, on the other, there are a multitude
of claims to have discovered new ‘smart
drugs’ that will target the neurochemical
bases of these troublesome conditions, for
example drugs that will target the neuronal
receptors involved in the pleasure effects of
alcohol or illegal drugs, and reduce the ‘de-
sire’ of the addict for their substance of
abuse.
There is a third face of risk, in which the
birth of bio-genetic personhood – of the per-
son with biological susceptibilities – is reor-
ganising less dramatic circuits of exclusion. I
have already mentioned fears of genetic dis-
crimination, where insurance eligibility, em-
ployment and the like, once linked at a rather
gross level to family history of health and ill-
ness, is now increasing tending to be molec-
ularised – with arguments about the legiti-
macy of genetic screening and the like. I
have argued elsewhere that it is somewhat
unlikely that the worst case scenarios of the
critics will come about (Novas & Rose,
2000). As all diseases come to be seen as
having a genetic basis, and all such bases
come to be seen as polygenetic matters of
susceptibility, such a binary will be impossi-
ble to maintain. As we all become re-config-
ured as bio-genetic persons, to exclude all
with susceptibilities for illness from insur-
ance or employment would, indeed, be to
exclude all. The more likely outcome is not
so much exclusion but modulation. This
would be the requirement that, if we are to be
employed, receive insurance or whatever, we
continually monitor our susceptibilities in
the light of all that might provoke them. And
that we adjust our forms of life, activities, in-
surance cover, financial planning and the like
in the light of them. We would be obliged to
sculpt our lives in terms of our own particu-
lar genetic and biological individuality. And
maybe these will soon seem no more strange
or reductionist than what have become com-
mon sense attributes of our somatic exist-
ence – height, weight, body shape or tastes.
Bio-psychiatry
My own work recently has focussedon a different part of the biomed-ical field – the rise of biological
psychiatry – biological explanations and
treatments of mental ill health. One might
term this ‘the birth of neurochemical self’.
And if one looks at psychiatry, and at its role
in the government of this new neurochemical
self, this argument for variability without
norms seems hard to sustain.
Of course, psychiatry has always been
plagued by the problem of its norms. In the
nineteenth century, clinical medicine as we
know it began when the gaze of the doctor
plunged into the interior of the body, visual-
ising the organic locations and lesions of the
symptoms that could be discerned on its sur-
face. From that moment onwards, to diag-
nose an illness was to interpret those symp-
toms in terms of the organic malfunctions
that were their cause. Of course, the mad
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person was one who came to notice, first of
all, because of a breach of the conventions of
order, conscience, civility, and norms of per-
sonhood. The new profession of psychiatry
attempted to ground this violation of norms
in a pathology that could be discovered in
very make-up of the mad person. But despite
its conviction that it was dealing with a dis-
ease of the brain, psychiatry failed to make
madness visible within this deep interior of
the body. At first, the doctors of the mad used
their educated vision to make their diag-
noses, and focussed upon the surface of the
body – posture, gaze, the colour of the skin
of the melancholic, the gestures of the mani-
ac, the movements of the hysteric. In the
twentieth century, the eye gave way to the
ear – it was the voice of the patient, what was
said, that was to be interpreted, and that pro-
vided the royal road to a diagnosis. Mental ill
health now seemed undeniably to be a psy-
chological matter.
In the twentieth century, of course, almost
all the criticisms of psychiatry stemmed
from its apparent inability to find an objec-
tive correlate for its judgements. When asked
“how do you know that this person is suffer-
ing from a mental illness”, psychiatrists
could only claim their expertise in interpre-
tation of the pathologies of conduct in ques-
tion, and the evidence of the diagnostic in-
terview. This problem arose in relation to
criminal responsibility in the courts of law,
where psychiatrists often found their own
forms of reasoning about madness were un-
able to meet legal criteria of evidence and
proof. It arose in cultural disputes, where
critics argued that, in the absence of objec-
tive correlates of its judgements, psychiatry
merely medicalised deviance and upheld the
norms of a patriarchal social order. It arose in
political controversies, where Western psy-
chiatrists accused their brethren in the Soviet
Union and elsewhere of political abuse of
psychiatric judgements. Hence Georges Can-
guilhem’s acerbic reflections in 1956, that
the psy sciences stood between two paths –
the uphill path led to the Pantheon where the
wise and the great were commemorated, the
downhill path led to the police station (Can-
guilheim, 1980).
Psychiatry today seems to stand at this
same crossroad. Down the one road, it seems
to be incorporating more and more condi-
tions that appear to be simply violations of
prevailing standards of acceptable person-
hood. One only has to consider a few of the
many new psychiatric categories that have
been created in the last twenty years – each
of which now forms the basis of a mini-psy-
chiatric specialism. We have post traumatic
shock disorder, attention deficit hyperactivi-
ty disorder, body dysphoric disorder, panic
disorder, social phobia. And, in addition,
there is that pandemic of ‘minor’ troubles
that now receive psychiatric attention even if
only in the form of medication – from anxi-
ety to sub-clinical depression. And there are
all the disorders of sleep, appetite, mood and
will in children that are now termed depres-
sion. Is this not the downhill path that, in the
end, still lead to the police station?
But, at the very same time, psychiatry, in
its new biological guise, claims to have con-
quered that steep hill to truth. The previous-
ly inaccessible bodily seat of the mind now
seems to be opened out and spread before the
psychiatric gaze. Brain imaging shows the
differences in the regions that light up in the
‘normal’ and ‘schizophrenic’ brain, or fail to
light up in the brain of a depressed person.
Molecular neuroscience anatomises the neu-
rones, the receptors, the neurotransmitters,
the cell membranes and ion channels, and al-
locates a specific pattern of functioning to
each normal or abnormal mental state.
Genetics seek the gene sequences that corre-
late with each diagnostic category – to iden-
tify the precise functions of the variations
they discover – a deficiency in the metabo-
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lism of a neurotransmitter, in the receptors,
in a particular channel. Pharmaceutical com-
panies fund most of this research: they com-
pete to fabricate a chemical corrective to this
molecular error – a serotonin selective reup-
take inhibitor, to take the most famous case
of Prozac.
Thus psychiatry claims to have overcome,
at last, the Cartesian dualism of body and
soul. In its new ‘neurochemical’ account of
personhood, it no longer distinguishes be-
tween organic and functional disorders, with
only the former being thought of as somatic.
It no longer concerns itself with the mind or
the psyche. Mind is simply what the body,
what the brain, does. And mental pathology is
simply the behavioural consequence of an
identifiable, and potentially correctable, error
or anomaly in some aspect of the brain – in
its neurotransmitters, receptors and the like.
What is this new psychiatric self? Let me
take an example at random from a recent pa-
per, concerned with a subtype of schizophre-
nia that is associated with aggressive symp-
toms. The paper argues that this condition is
linked to a variation in a single base in the
gene for an enzyme called catechol-O-me-
thyl-transferase (COMT). This gene has been
located to chromosome 22q11 and se-
quenced. The variation is a transition from G
(guanine) to A (adenine) in the DNA se-
quence. It leads to valine being substituted
for methionine in codon 158 of the enzyme.
This enzyme has been shown to be involved
in the breakdown of certain neurotransmit-
ters. So an error in the make up of the en-
zyme will disrupt this breakdown process,
leading to more or less of the neurotransmit-
ter in question being present in the synapses
in particular regions of the brain. And other
research has shown that violent behaviour
can be linked to anomalies in the synthesis or
breakdown of these neurotransmitters
(Strous et.al., 1997). Here we can see the
paradigmatic ‘style of thought’ of biological
psychiatry. It proceeds from symptoms to the
brain to neurotransmitters to gene se-
quences. A simple reversal of this chain of
detection appears to generate a chain of
causality.
The initial diagnosis seems normative
enough. The symptoms only appear as such
in relation to conventional cultural standards
of personhood, conduct and public order.
And once more, a reading from the social to
the vital seems to take place, as these are in-
terpreted as consequential upon a defective
biological state. But at the biological level
we do not seem to have a violation of a norm
– the norm of an organic and self-regulating
system disturbed by illness. What we seem
to have here is an error, simply a mistake in
a bit of the machinery of the brain and its
neurochemistry. And this is an error that is
potentially correctable – for if it is merely a
question of a chemical malfunction, we can,
potentially, fabricate an artificial alternative,
a drug. Not to normalise the person, but to
correct an error. So even in these extraordi-
narily simplistic versions of the genetic and
neurochemical basis of mental ill health, the
logic of the norm seems to have mutated.
In fact, the most hard-headed advocates of
behavioural genomics seldom adopt this
simplistic analysis that links one gene to one
condition. Most now argue that, in the biolo-
gy and genetics on mental illness, we are not
dealing with single genes and unitary patho-
logies but with variations in multiple loci in
multiple gene systems resulting in continu-
ous distributions of phenotypes and suscepti-
bilities to particular disorders in specific en-
vironments (McGuffin et. al, 2001). In this
complex set of relays and relations, the con-
sequences of a genetic and neurochemical
account of mental illness are not fatalism.
On the contrary, the writers here draw a dif-
ferent lesson. Genetic diagnosis will help in-
dividuals take responsibility for the manage-
ment of their condition, for the control of
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their susceptibilities, for the use of all possi-
ble forms of pharmacological correction of
the underlying error or deficiency, thus en-
abling the susceptible individual to maintain
themselves in the circuits of inclusion. The
chain of reasoning characteristic of biologi-
cal psychiatry operates to underpin a dream
of individually tailored pharmaceutical inter-
vention at the molecular level to correct a
susceptibility. This is not so much normali-
sation as correction.
But surely, psychiatry still treads the
downhill path to the police station. Of course
it does – we know that many individuals are
being confined and treated against their will.
But many do not go that distance. Psychiatry
is not confined to those gross violations of
institutional norms leading to a loss of citi-
zenship and normalisation under compul-
sion. Increasingly, psychiatric categories re-
late to everyday failures of integration of the
individual into those circuits of consumption
and autonomous self actualisation. And psy-
chiatric treatments – drugs and cognitive the-
rapies being the predominant forms of treat-
ment in the UK and USA these days – seek
to maintain the affected individual within
those circuits or restore them to them – to re-
activate the capacity to live a normal life, to
craft a life for oneself.
One indicator of this is the blurring of the
distinction that psychiatry used to try to
maintain between states and traits. The state
of illness requires a definite change of func-
tioning in the patient at a definite moment in
time. You were well, you are now ill, you
may get well again. Traits are persistent un-
derlying features of the individual. So if you
were a cheery soul and now are having trou-
ble sleeping, eating, getting fun out of life,
you may have a depressive illness. If you are
a generally miserable kind of person, well
that’s your personality, not an illness– persis-
tent melancholics are not suffering from a
depressive illness but from a depressive per-
sonality. Psychiatry treats illnesses, it has
long been claimed, not states – hence it can-
not treat anti-social personality disorder –
psychopathy – because that is not an illness.
But now this distinction is hard to maintain.
Take neuroses, for example. The category
has actually disappeared from DSM IV – the
diagnostic bible of the American Psychiatric
Association, as have associated notions, such
as reactive or neurotic depression. If we take
neurotic depression, well a form of depres-
sion less severe than major affective disorder
is now termed ‘dysthemic disorder’ and it is
said to be often associated with a lowness of
mood that begins early in life (“I’ve always
been this way”). Hence it merges impercep-
tibly with the trait diagnosis of personality
disorder. And now, biological and genetic
correlates of these neurotic conditions may
be found. So if these conditions can be cor-
rected with drugs, and it is claimed they can,
what has become of the distinction between
treatment of an illness and modification of a
personality trait? It is hard to maintain. Traits
must be treated as well as states, because
traits are, once more, susceptibilities. The
door to psychiatric treatment of personality –
to reshaping and enhancement of neuro-
chemical personhood – is already wide open.
Psychiatry, then, still has a key role in
governing the self. This is not merely to re-
turn the individual to a fixed norm of
civilised conduct as housewife or worker – a
once off programme of normalisation. Ra-
ther, its ambition is the restoration, and con-
tinual, long-term maintenance of the free,
autonomous, individual obliged to choose
and to take responsibility for his or her life as
if it were an outcome of acts of choice. But
further, biological psychiatry seems to be of-
fering the possibility of the calculated modi-
fication and augmentation of personhood it-
self. In its new neurochemical and psycho-
pharmacological guise, it is contributing to
the idea of the flexible, manipulable self –
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manipulable not only in the service of pro-
jects of normalisation, but manipulable by
the person him or herself in the service of en-
hancement of capacities. Psychiatry, that is
to say, is deeply implicated in the continual
process of modulation of capacities that has
become the life’s work of each active citizen.
Capitalisation
Finally, let me say a little about the mostobvious feature that underpins all thatI have said so far about what is hap-
pening today – the enormous capitalisation
of the life sciences and biotechnology – the
capitalisation of life itself.
First, consider the capitalisation of the
treatment capacities of medicine, in particu-
lar via the pharmaceutical companies, whose
shareholder value is utterly dependent upon
the production, marketing and medical take-
up of a few blockbuster drugs. The top 5
drugs prescribed in the USA in 1999 being
Premarin, a conjugated oestrogen for the
treatment of symptoms of the menopause –
hormone replacement therapy; Levothy-
roxine for the treatment of thyroid deficien-
cy – a condition characterised by general
lethargy and lack of activity; Lipitor, for the
treatment of hyperlipdemia – high levels of
blood lipids thought to predispose to heart
attack; and Omeprazole for the treatment of
peptic disorders and ulcers. Prozac was
tenth, but its close cousin Zoloft was 11th
and Paxil was 15th – these are drugs that
have vastly reshaped and extended our be-
liefs as to what is treatable depression; Via-
gra, the anti-impotence drug which claims to
extend and enhance sexual potency only
came in at 47th, but this was 1999. The pow-
er to reshape life – the words ‘illness’ and
‘cure’ seem inadequate here – seems to ex-
tend way beyond what we previously under-
stood as illness. These top selling drugs are
those that treat ‘life conditions’ and are thus
prescribed ‘chronically’ rather than ‘acute-
ly’. Biomedicine has already rewritten the
norms of reproduction – its timetables, its
kinship relations. Hormone replacement
treatment is already rewriting the norms of
female ageing. Drugs for ‘panic disorder’
such as Alazopram are rewriting the norms
of social interaction. So the capitalisation of
the power to treat intensifies the redefinition
of that which is amenable to correction or
modification. This is not simply blurring the
borders between normality and pathology, or
widening the net of pathology. It is mobilis-
ing ideals of hypernormativity – we see a
kind of co-production of the drug and the
niche market for it, and in the process, the
emergence of a much more general market
for drugs that will reshape our capacities to
live.
Second, we have a capitalisation of truth
itself. Vast sums of money, huge research
teams, enormously expensive equipment are
now required to produce biological and bio-
medical truth. The idea of a distinction be-
tween pure science and application can no
longer be maintained. We can no longer be-
lieve that things are first discovered in the
pure world of knowledge and then set to
work in the mundane word of existence and
commerce. The laboratory is itself a factory.
Bioscience knows by creating, by transform-
ing, by intervening. Increasingly it knows by
manufacturing – creating all those lifelike
things that never existed before – from im-
mortal cell lines, to cloned DNA sequences
within bacteria, to mice with artificially in-
serted or deactivated genes. Its priorities, its
funding, its machinery and its processes are
industrialised. The pharmaceutical industry
has been central to research on neurochem-
istry, the biotech industry to research on
cloning, genetech firms to the sequencing of
the human genome. This is a genuinely new
field and we do not yet really grasp its oper-
ations. These new alliances between aspira-
31
OUTLINES • No. 1 • 2001
Outlines-2001-1.qxd  19-06-01  13:31  Side 31
Nicolas Rose: Normality and Pathology in a Biological Age
tions to health, to profit, to professional ad-
vancement, to discovery, to human improve-
ment are reshaping the very idea and the
very reality of what it is to be human.
Third there is the capitalisation of the
body, or rather of organs, tissues and cells.
The human genome has become a happy
hunting ground for venture capitalists and
gene-tech companies. The line between dis-
coveries and inventions is hard to maintain,
as discoveries are transformed into property
through patent law and the devices of intel-
lectual property. There is a flourishing trade
in organs, body parts and cells, for trans-
plantation, research and for pharmaceutical
manufacture. There is a growing industry of
DNA profiling – for health, insurance and
police, and also for individual paternity suits.
No doubt there is much more. This is one as-
pect of the rise of what Catherine Waldby
has termed ‘biovalue’: the new imperative is
to produce a kind of “surplus value of vitali-
ty and instrumental knowledge” from the hu-
man body itself (Waldby, 2000: 19). Con-
temporary biotechnology, that is to say, does
not only manage vitality. It does not only
seek to combat things which would threaten
that vitality. It is geared to the production of
knowledges and techniques that can actually
enhance vitality. It seeks to instrumentalise
these possibilities, integrating them in eco-
nomies of health, of lifestyle, of productivi-
ty. The life science and biomedicine are now
attuned to the maximisation of biovalue. In
this context, those aspects of life that were
previously devalued – deviations from the
norm to be controlled – now seem to be pre-
cisely opportunities for the creation of value
– to discover new genetic and neurochemical
errors is to open new markets and new cus-
tomers for new products.
One of the most fundamental conse-
quences of this capitalisation is that truth is
no longer a sufficient value to legitimate and
drive the biosciences. As Paul Rabinow has
pointed out, truth is certainly insufficient to
animate the financial and institutional condi-
tions – the venture capitalists, patent
lawyers, pharmaceutical companies – upon
which the biosciences depend today – de-
pend in an absolute sense in that these are the
conditions of the knowledges they generate.
Health, not truth, has become the central val-
ue – a value which is both moral and com-
mercial. Where Foucault analysed biopoli-
tics, we now must analyse bio-economics, in
which human capital is to be understood in a
rather literal sense – in terms of the new link-
ages between the politics and economics of
life itself.
Concluding thoughts
In the West, at least, it seems that the sa-cred is no longer simply somethingabove and beyond life, no longer the
realm of spirit and salvation. The body itself
has become sacred. Salvation has become
linked to our existence as corporeal, somatic
individuals. And health has come to be seen
as our principal ethical value. We have here
a whole ‘economy of hope’. This economy
thrives on perceptions of scarcity – funding
for public health care seems always inade-
quate, institutions discriminate on grounds
of health, illness is a financial burden, pro-
viding for treatment a constant worry, loss of
health a constant threat. It seems there is
never enough health. In an economy of
scarcity, hope – for cures, for fitness, for
longevity, for procreation – has become in-
trinsic to a whole set of economic relations
–the creation of markets by companies, the
activities of scientists, the work of the mass
media, the actions of patients, potential pa-
tients, support groups and families in fund
raising and the like. In the apt term proposed
by Carlos Novas, this is “the political econo-
my of hope” (Novas, In Press).
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The ethical issues raised by these devel-
opments are profound. But I do not think
they can be resolved by repeating the com-
forting slogans of informed consent, the dig-
nity of the individual, the best interests of the
child or ‘do no harm’. For it is our very ethi-
cal presuppositions that are at stake here, our
conceptions of personhood, of the distinc-
tions between fate and choice, nature and ar-
tificiality. And these presuppositions are be-
ing reshaped at the micro-level, through the
thousands of everyday decisions that are be-
ing taken by researchers, investors, managers
of pharmaceutical companies, doctors and
patients. It is there, in the actual field of bio-
medical research and practice, that the truly
significant ethical work is being undertaken
– on who we are, what we must do and what
we can hope for.
What, finally, of norms. I have suggested
that we have escaped, at least partially, the
era of the normal and the pathological, with
a causality burdened by the shadows of in-
famy, guilt and blame. Ours is, perhaps, a
time of errors, of anomalies, of mistakes,
which carry no such moral loads. Cancer no
longer is ‘a cancer at the heart of society’ but
a susceptibility written in a particular se-
quence of bases in a gene (Sontag, 1979).
For normalisation, read correction. Cor-
rection blurs the distinction between treat-
ment, adjustment and enhancement. Of
course, these judgements still carry a moral
burden. But I do not think this is the same as
it was when norms were inscribed in the very
vital essence of each human being. And I do
not think that control still operates by over-
laying the normal the average, the virtuous,
the ideal and the socially adapted. This it
why I think – though I am far from certain,
that we are no longer governed by the logic
of the norm.
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